Mass Nouns, Count Nouns and Non-Count Laycock – – In Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier. A crucial part of Taurek’s argument is his contention that i. John M. Taurek, ” Should the Numbers Count?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 6, no. 4. (Summer I ). Oxford University Press USA publishes scholarly works in all academic disciplines, bibles, music, children’s books, business books, dictionaries, reference.
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Inductive Inference and the Acquisition of Number Concepts. Wasserman, David and Alan Strudler. Accordingly, here is a taxonomy of the possible actions available to Yoda along with the outcomes of those actions: Round 2 given that Secura was chosen in round 1: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Additionally, nothing that I will claim depends upon these notions being non-vague. How is this possible? The possibility of altruism.
The rejection of PAI opens up an opportunity for pro-number nonconsequentialists to offer a different view of the separateness of persons, one in which pairwise interpersonal comparison, substitution, balancing and division would be permitted. The harm that S can prevent for x the smaller number is significantly greater in comparison to the harm that S can prevent both for y and for z the greater number.
One should not flip a coin, because persons are valuable: Accordingly, in i A has both arms restored and Susan has no limbs restored. In particular, I shall argue that a nonconsequentialist can permit aggregation and still respect the separateness of persons. In i A, B, and C each have both arms restored; they are prevented from continuing to endure the same harm.
Hours after they leave the spaceship, it is realized the flesh of A, B, C, and Secura will begin to disintegrate in a horribly painful manner barring some quick intervention. Saving A is equivalent to saving B. This latter fact could be taken to be true iff PN is true. I cannot give a satisfactory account of the meaning of judgments of this kind Taurekpp. Michael Otsuka has suggested though that Taurek can reject this line of thought by drawing a distinction between pairwise comparisons which do not involve any appeal to groups and those comparisons that involve appeals to groups.
But regardless, we have seen that there is certainly a viable way out of the inconsistency for the Numbers Partly Count proponent—a kind of numbers skeptic. Moreover, unlike a sizable portion of the debate between Taurek and his opponents, the Otsuka 2.
Don’t Count on Taurek: Vindicating the Case for the Numbers Counting | Yishai Cohen –
In each case, some cost is borne for the sake of the greater overall good. If equal claims can be interpersonally substituted and divided, why can they not be aggregated? At the same time, a world in which A survives and B dies seems just as bad as a world in which A dies and B survives. Belknap Press,pp. It is this evaluative judgment cpunt I cannot accept See also Hirose, I. In other words, it is permissible to give each group an equal chance of being saved, irrespective of the difference in size between the groups.
Indeed, as noted earlier, Taurek does not say that one must toss a coin. See also our discussion of philosophy and mental health issues here. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9: Exceptions are made only for posts about philosophers with substantive content, e. However, if, as PAI says, all persons are incommensurable, then there seems to be no couunt of comparing A and B.
Philosophy and Public Affairs Of course, pro-number nonconsequentialists have shied away from aggregation because they think that it violates the separateness of persons. The taurdk of x and y are equal in comparison prior to any intervention by S.
These are just the minimum requirements. One would be required to save the one individual on this approach. If S does nothing, then neither x nor y will be spared from harm. It should be noted that Taurek goes on to say that “There may well come a point, however, at which the difference between what B stands to lose jhon C stands to lose is such that I would spare C his loss.
The other three—A, B, and C—only need one pill in order to restore both of their arms. Willenken argues that we ought to accept commonsense morality rather than endorse the following Strongest numbrrs thesis: To which island should you go? Suppose there are one million people on one side and one individual on the other. So, if PN is false one should prefer i over ivand not vice versa. Submit a new link. I think that Otsuka can establish this conclusion, but not by way of how he presents the argument.
Death and Whom to Save from It. So, the general principle which the Numbers Partly Count proponent could further endorse is the following one which renders the verdict that, instead of selecting option iYoda ought to give all four Jedi a chance of being aided: Abstracts should make clear what the linked material is about and what its thesis is.
Call this the Broken Finger Objection. In that case, accommodating this alleged fact could similarly be done by giving all four Jedi a chance of being aided.
I will not, however, be concerned with whether there is a similar true moral principles regarding being the cause of a harm to someone in the colloquial sense of the term.
However, if Spock were to fall into the lava, Spock would suffer more than Uhura if Uhura coutn to fall into the lava by a significant degree because Spock is half-Vulcan, and the burning of Vulcan flesh gives rise to more suffering by a significant degree in comparison to the suffering caused by the burning of human flesh.